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Abstract—This paper presents the Trusted Integrated Knowl-
edge Dataspace (TIKD), a new dataspace, based on linked data
technologies and trusted data sharing, that supports integrated
knowledge graphs for sensitive application environments such as
healthcare. State-of-the-art shared dataspaces do not consider
sensitive data and privacy-aware log records as part of their
solutions, defining only how to access data. TIKD complements
dataspace security approaches through trusted data sharing that
considers personal data handling, data privileges, pseudonymiza-
tion of user activity logging, and privacy-aware data interlinking
services. TIKD was implemented on the Access Risk Knowledge
(ARK) Platform, a socio-technical risk governance system, and
deployed as part of the ARK-Virus Project which aims to govern
the risk management of Personal Protection Equipment (PPE)
across a group of collaborating healthcare institutions. The ARK
Platform was evaluated, both before and after implementing the
TIKD, using the ISO 27001 Gap Analysis Tool (GAT) which
determines compliance with the information security standard.
The results of the evaluation indicated that compliance with
ISO 27001 increased from 50% to 85%. The evaluation also
provided a set of recommended actions to meet the remaining
requirements of the ISO 27001 standard. TIKD provides a
collaborative environment, based on knowledge graph integration
and GDPR-compliant personal data handling, as part of the data
security infrastructure. As a result of this work, a new trusted
data security methodology, based on personal data handling,
data privileges, access control context specification, and privacy-
aware data interlinking, was developed using a knowledge graph
approach.
Index Terms—Dataspace, Knowledge Graph, Trusted Data,
Personal Data Handling
I. INTRODUCTION
Sharing data between healthcare organizations can facilitate
medical diagnosis and biomedical research. Healthcare data is
sensitive and organizations understand the importance of se-
curely sharing, storing, managing, and accessing medical data.
Recent work in medical data sharing is based on cryptosystems
and blockchain approaches [1]–[3]. These approaches were
designed to facilitate the sharing of patient medical records
This research has received funding from the ADAPT Centre for Digital
Content Technology, funded under the SFI Research Centres Programme
(Grant 13/RC/2106 P2), co-funded by the European Regional Development
Fund and the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation
programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No. 713567.
For the purpose of Open Access, the author has applied a CC BY public
copyright licence to any Author Accepted Manuscript version arising from
this submission’.
between healthcare institutions but do not support collabora-
tive data sharing environments for the purpose of research,
for example, where sensitive data could be shared between
partners to improve or support related works. This paper
explores the use of dataspace, a data management framework
capable of interrelating heterogeneous data, for the sharing of
sensitive data in a collaborative environment, as well as the
use of knowledge graphs (KGs) in constructing a trusted data
sharing environment.
In recent years, KGs have become the base of many infor-
mation systems which require access to structured knowledge.
A KG provides semantically structured information which
can be interpreted by computers, offering great promise for
building more intelligent systems [4]. KGs have been ap-
plied in different domains such as recommendation systems,
information retrieval, medicine, education, and cybersecurity
among others [5]. For example, in the medical domain, KGs
have being used to construct, integrate, and map healthcare
information. In the security domain, KGs have being used to
detect and predict dynamic attacks.
A dataspace follows a “pay-as-you-go” approach where the
priority is to set up the most beneficial aspects of the dataspace
functionality, and to improve the semantic cohesion of the
dataspace over time [6], [7]. The services offered over the
aggregated data do not lose their surrounding context, i.e.,
the data is still managed by the owner, prevailing autonomy
needs [8].
A shared dataspace involving sensitive data requires per-
sonal data handling alongside data security methods. Biomed-
ical data sharing [9] is an example of a collaborative dataspace
where sensitive data could be shared as part of a research
project. Medical data sharing approaches [1]–[3] use cryp-
tosystems to share patients’ medical records between health
institutions, thus relying on cloud services to manage data.
According to Curry et al. [10], a trusted data sharing dataspace
should consider personal data handling and data security, such
as access control and usage control, in a clear legal framework.
As such, this work explores the following research question:
to what extent will the development of an integrated sharing
dataspace, based on linked data technologies, personal data
handling, data privileges, and data interlinking, contribute
to building a trusted sharing dataspace in a collaborative
environment? In response, this paper proposes the Trusted
Integrated Knowledge Dataspace (TIKD) - an approach to the
problem of secure data sharing in collaborative dataspaces.
The contributions of this research are:
1) A new trusted dataspace, based on knowledge graph
integration and information security management, for
collaborative, high risk environments such as healthcare.
2) An information security management system based on
personal data handling, data privileges, pseudonymiza-
tion of user logs, and privacy-aware data interlinking.
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows:
the Use Case section defines the requirements of the ARK-
Virus project. The Related Work section presents the state-
of-the-art in shared dataspace approaches. The Description of
the TIKD details the services of the dataspace. The Evaluation
section presents the results from the ISO 27001 GAT. Finally,
the Conclusion section presents a summary of this research
and its future directions.
II. USE CASE - ARK-VIRUS DATA SHARING
The ARK-Virus Project aims to provide a collaborative
space for Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) risk manage-
ment across diverse healthcare and public service organiza-
tions [11]. The ARK Platform uses Semantic Web technologies
to model, integrate, and classify PPE risk data, from both
qualitative and quantitative sources, into a unified knowl-
edge graph. This model is expressed using the ARK Cube
Ontology1 and the ARK Platform Vocabulary2 [11], [12].
The Cube ontology is used in the overall architecture of the
ARK Platform by supporting data analysis through the Cube
methodology - an established methodology used for analyzing
socio-technical systems and for managing associated risks
[13], [14]. The Platform vocabulary allows for the modeling
of platform users, access controls, user permissions and data
classifications.
Through the ARK-Virus Project a set of security require-
ments for the ARK Platform were defined (see Table I).
These requirements include data interlinking, data accessibil-
ity (privacy-aware evidence distillation), and secure evidence
publication (as Linked Open Data), as priority security aspects.
The state-of-the-art in shared dataspaces does not consider data
access level and data sharing level selection mechanisms. The
ARK platform implements the TIKD model to cope with these
requirements (see Table I) and to provide secure management
of personal data, pseudonymized data (for GDPR-compliance),
and security logs (for history records).
III. RELATED WORK
Shared dataspace approaches are concerned with security
aspects, such as access control [9], [10], [15], [16] and usage
control [17], [18], in order to provide services based on the
dataspace philosophy of ‘pay-as-you-go’. Shared dataspaces
are primarily associated with the Internet of Things (IoT) [10],
1Available at https://openark.adaptcentre.ie/Ontologies/ARKCube
2Available at https://openark.adaptcentre.ie/Ontologies/ARKPlatform
[15], [16], [18], where data integration from heterogeneous
devices and access control are the main objective. In the
field of trusted data sharing, data management approaches
focus on cryptography techniques and blockchain methods in
order to share data between agents (users/institutions) [1]–[3].
Blockchain is an internet database technology characterized
by decentralization, transparency, and data integrity [19]. On
the other hand, access control is based on public and private
key cryptography. Table II provides a comparison of the state-
of-the-art works and TIKD in relation to the requirements of
the ARK-Virus Project.
Shared dataspace approaches cope with data fusion [16],
usage control between multiple organizations [17], real-time
data sharing [10], and privacy protection [15]. However,
these approaches do not provide mechanisms for personal
data handling in compliance with GDPR, defined levels of
data access, or privacy-protected interlinking with external
resources. TIKD is based on a set of Linked Data vocabularies
that support these aspects.
IV. DESCRIPTION OF THE TIKD
The Trusted Integrated Knowledge Dataspace (TIKD) was
designed in accordance with the ARK-Virus Project security
requirements (see Section II). The TIKD services (Figure 1)
define data permissions (knowledge graph integration, sub-
graph generation, and data interlinking), user access grants
(security control), and external resource integration (data inter-
linking) to provide a trusted environment. The next subsections
explain each of these services.
Fig. 1. The Trusted Integrated Knowledge Dataspace Services.
A. Knowledge Graph Integration
The knowledge graph integration service (Figure 1, Knowl-
edge Graph Integration) is a central component of the TIKD.
This service defines a dataspace where: i) multiple users can
TABLE I
ARK-VIRUS PROJECT REQUIREMENTS, DESCRIPTION, AND THE SOLUTION PROPOSED WITH THE TIKD MODEL.
# Requirement Description Solution proposedwith TIKD
1 Data encryption
Data stored on the ARK Platform will be encrypted
and stored securely in line with the ISO 27001 in-
formation security standards.
The TIKD model will be deployed in an encrypted
system based on a Linux Unified Key Setup (LUKS).
Information security management will consider the
ISO 27001 Gap Analysis Tool as a base reference.
2 Privacy-AwareEvidence Distillation
Users will be able to manually classify the informa-
tion they enter into the platform as Public, Internal,
Confidential or Restricted.
Data will be securely stored in an evidence base and
only accessible to users with the appropriate level
of clearance.
The TIKD model defines a usage control to set acc-
ess grants over data, determining who can collaborate
(write access) on a project and who can read it (read-
only access).
3 Data Interlinking
An interlinking function will allow users of the ARK-
Virus platform to interlink risk management data with
evidence stored within the platform and, in future
iterations, related data held in external authoritative
databases.
The TIKD model integrates an interlinking service
to provide anonymous evidence integration. The
evidence is integrated by means of data catalogues
(DCAT) records describing the evidence metadata.
4
Evidence Publication
as Linked Open Data
(LOD)
Data stored in the ARK-Virus Platform database that
has been classified as ‘Public’ will be made available
as LOD via an open data portal.
The usage control service defines how data could
be accessed based on their classification level. The
data classified as public could be searched and
collected for open publication purposes.
work on a KG within an organization, ii) multiple organiza-
tions can create KGs, iii) linking to datasets by means of the
Data Catalog Vocabulary3 (DCAT), instead of graphs/data, is
supported, iv) fine-grained record linkage via DCAT records is
supported, and v) where evidence and KG integration/linking
is supported. DCAT is used to describe a set of resources
associated with an specific organization but different authors.
Each KG is defined based on the ARK-Platform and the ARK-
Cube ontologies.
B. Security Control
The Security Control service (Figure 1, Security Control)
is the main service of the TIKD. This service makes use
of Linked Data vocabularies to handle personal data, access
control context specification, usage control, and user logs.
Personal data is described using the DPV, which was proposed
by the W3C’s Data Privacy Vocabularies and Controls Com-
munity Group (DPVCG). The DPV defines a set of classes
and properties that can be used to describe and represent
information about personal data handling for the purpose of
GDPR compliance.
The Access Control service mediates every request to the
resources and data stored on the ARK Platform, determining
whether the request should be granted or denied. TIKD defines
a discretionary access control (DAC), based on context spec-
ification, where data owners can authorize and control data
access. The Access Control service defines a user through
the User4 class from the ARK-Platform ontology. The User
class was extended with the properties username, password,
and email. The user’s role determines their privileges over
a KG - here the highest role is owner, the medium role
3https://www.w3.org/TR/vocab-dcat-2/
4https://openark.adaptcentre.ie/Ontologies/ARKPlatform#User
is collaborator, and the lowest role is read-only. The Usage
Control and Access Control services were designed to meet the
Privacy-Aware Evidence Distillation requirement. The Usage
Control service defines what users can, or can not, do on the
ARK platform based on their role. In the context of TIKD, the
Usage Control service ensures that a user has the appropriate
role to access the KG as well as the corresponding data
permissions (read/write). According to user’s role, data owners
and collaborators can read and write in the KG, whereas read-
only users can only visualize the information in the KG. The
Usage Control service is implemented based on the ARK-
Platform ontology through the User class and the following
properties:
• isOwnerOf5: relates an owner with a KG. The owner user
can read and write.
• isCollaboratorOf6: relates a collaborator with a KG. The
collaborator user can read and write.
• isReadOnlyUserOf7: relates a read-only user with a KG.
The read-only user can visualize the project.
Finally, the User Log service will record the actions per-
formed by users during their sessions on the ARK platform.
User information is pseudonymized in the log data, using
the Secure Hash Algorithm 3 (SHA-3), by combining the
username, email, and registration date parameters. The user
logs will record user activities on the platform and the results
retrieved by the system (failure, success, warning, etc.) during
a session, e.g., if the user tries to modify the KG but their
role is read-only, the user log process will record this activity
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ontology8 is used to implement the user logs, following an
agent-centered perspective (i.e. focusing on the people or
organizations involved in the data generation or manipulation
process).
C. Data Interlinking
By means of an interlinking service, TIKD supports the
integration of KGs and also provides special support for the
integration of potentially sensitive external resources (a data
interlinking requirement of the ARK-Virus Project).
The Data Interlinking service allows users to add data from
an external source as evidence. The evidence is used to support
data defined in the KG. Evidence is interlinked through DCAT
records. A DCAT record is generated through the privacy-
aware metadata factory. The resulting DCAT record will be
available only to the data owner and collaborators.
D. Subgraph Generation
The Subgraph Generation service (Figure 1, Subgraph Gen-
eration) provides the functionality of sharing data as private
(owner and collaborators), or public (any agent in the system).
The owner and/or collaborators of a KG have the ability to
change the sharing permissions of the data subgraph.
The ARK-Virus Project defines a collaborative environment
where different users can share data from their own KGs using
a privacy-aware sharing mechanism whereby confidential or
sensitive data cannot be shared outside an organization. This
sharing functionality helps to reuse information to enrich
related KGs. In this sense, the Subgraph Generation service
8https://www.w3.org/TR/2013/NOTE-prov-primer-20130430/
helps to extend or complement information from one KG to
another.
V. SECURITY EVALUATION OF THE ARK PLATFORM
This section presents a security evaluation of the ARK
platform considering the requirements of the ISO 27001 stan-
dard. The ISO 270019 (ISO/IEC 27001) is a specification for
information security management systems (ISMS). The ISO
27001 helps to increase the reliability and security of systems
and information, and improved customer and business partner
confidence, by means of a set of requirements.
The security evaluation of the ARK Platform10 was con-
ducted using the ISO 27001 Gap Analysis Tool (GAT)11. The
ISO 27001 GAT can be used to identify gaps in ISO 27001
compliance, and to prioritize areas for future work. Some
features of the ISO 27001 GAT are listed below:
• The tool contains a set of sample audit questions.
• It lists all ISO 27001:2013 requirements, identifying what
documentation is mandatory for compliance.
The ISO 27001 GAT consist of 41 questions divided into
seven clauses. Each clause is divided into sub-clauses, con-
taining one or more requirements (questions). For example,
the clause “Leadership” is divided into three sub-clauses, the
first sub-clause is leadership and commitment, containing three
requirements. The first requirement is: “are the general ISMS
9https://www.iso.org/isoiec-27001-information-security.html
10The evaluation was performed by three computer scientists with strong
backgrounds in Linked Data and security systems. The first evaluation was
performed in February 2021 and the second was performed in April 2021
11https://www.itgovernance.eu/en-ie/shop/product/
iso-27001-gap-analysis-tool
objectives compatible with the strategic direction?”, a positive
answer means that the ISMS supports the achievement of the
business objectives.
The ISO 27001 GAT was conducted on the ARK Platform
both before and after implementing TIKD. Before implement-
ing TIKD, the ARK Platform only used access control, based
on authentication process, to provide access to the platform.
The results of both evaluations can be seen in Table III where
#Req. defines the number of requirements for each sub-clause,
Impl defines the number of implemented requirements, and
%Impl. defines the percentage of implemented requirements.
It can be seen that compliance with the ISO 27001 standard
increased, from 53.66% to 85.37%, after implementing the
TIKD on the ARK platform. There was a notable increase in
the “Operation” and “Performance evaluation” clauses after
the TIKD was employed. However, there are still some re-
quirements that are yet to be addressed in order to achieve an
increased level of compliance with the ISO 27001 standard.
Table IV outlines these unaddressed requirements as well as
the action needed to implement them.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper the Trusted Integrated Knowledge Dataspace
(TIKD) was presented as an approach to securely share data
in collaborative environments by considering personal data
handling, data privileges, access control context specification,
and a privacy-aware data interlinking.
TIKD was implemented in the ARK platform, considering
the security requirements of the ARK-Virus project, to explore
the extent to which an integrated sharing dataspace, based on
linked data technologies, personal data handling, data privi-
leges, and interlinking data, contributes to building a trusted
sharing dataspace in a collaborative environment. In compari-
son with state-of-the-art works, TIKD integrates solutions for
security aspects, data interlinking, GDPR-compliant personal
data handling as part of the data security infrastructure, and
evidence interlinking.
The security evaluation of the ARK platform was conducted
using the ISO 27001 Gap Analysis Tool (GAT). The evaluation
compared two versions of the ARK platform, a version before
TIKD implementation and a version after TIKD implementa-
tion. According to the results, the implementation of the TIKD
achieved a 85.35% ISO 27001 compliance score, improving
the security aspects of the ARK platform as compared to the
version before TIKD implementation.
Future work will focus on addressing the remaining ISO
27001 standard requirements. Additionally, the TIKD will be
evaluated by the project stakeholders, and their feedback will
be used to distill further requirements.
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TABLE III






Impl. %Impl. Impl. %Impl.
Context of the
organization
Understanding the organization and its context 3 2 66.67% 2 66.67%
Understanding the needs and expectations of
interested parties 2 2 100% 2 100%
Determining the scope of the information
security management system 1 0 0% 1 100%
Information security management system 1 0 0% 1 100%
Leadership
Leadership and commitment 3 3 100% 3 100%
Policy 2 0 0% 2 100%
Organizational roles, responsibilities and
authorities 1 1 100% 1 100%
Planning Actions to address risks and opportunities 3 1 33.33% 3 100%Information security objectives and planning
to achieve them 2 1 50% 2 100%
Support
Resources 1 1 100% 1 100%
Competence 1 1 100% 1 100%
Awareness 1 1 100% 1 100%
Communication 1 1 100% 1 100%
Documented information 3 2 66.67% 3 100%
Operation
Operational planning and control 3 3 100% 3 100%
Information security risk assessment 1 0 0% 1 100%
Information risk treatment 2 0 0% 1 50%
Performance
evaluation
Monitoring, measurement, analysis and
evaluation 2 0 0% 2 100%
Internal audit 2 0 0% 1 50%
Management review 2 2 100% 2 100%
Improvement Nonconformity and corrective action 3 0 0% 0 0%Continual improvement 1 1 100% 1 100%
TOTAL 41 22 53.66% 35 85.37%
TABLE IV
UNADDRESSED CLAUSES AND THE ACTION NEEDED TO COMPLY WITH ISO 27001 REQUIREMENT.
Clause Requirement Action to Perform
Context of the
organization
Did the organization determine how internal and external
issues could influence the ISMS ability to achieve its
intended outcomes?
Organization stakeholders will be define how
internal and external issues can affect the security
model.
Operation
Is there a documented list with all controls deemed as
necessary, with proper justification and implementation
status?
A set of actions, to address risks, will be established.




Are internal audits performed according to an audit
program, results reported through an internal audit report,
and relevant corrective actions raised?
An internal audit will be performed.
Improvement
Does the organization react to every nonconformity? Non-conformity data will be collected from the stakeholders.
Does the organization consider eliminating the cause of
the non-conformity and, where appropriate, take
corrective action?
A document with the procedure(s) to address non-conformities,
including the identification of causes and actions to prevent
recurrence, will be prepared.
Are all non-conformities recorded, together with
corrective actions?
The results will be recorded for future reference and corres
-ponding documentation will be prepared.
